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EVALUATING LEGISLATION: REGULATION OF PRE-
EMPLOYMENT INQUIRIES
Ann H. Britton*
Legislation regulating the type of information employers may ask of
job applicants is difficult to draft and evaluate because of the complex
competing interests of employers and employees that must be balanced.
This Article proposes that a matrix can be built to chart and test different
approaches to the problem. This matrix can then be used to track how
the varied and competing interests are affected under proposed or existing
legislation.' The method of evaluating legislation will be described and its
usefulness demonstrated through a specific application of the matrix to
answer the question of who should decide how much information about
a job applicant's health and handicaps an employer may elicit. 2
One benefit of constructing the chart to evaluate problematic legislation
is that it stimulates thinking and, thereby, ensures that all affected interests
are considered. The process also forces a thorough consideration of com-
plex issues and viewpoints because it requires evaluating the effect of a
specific statute on competing interests. Finally, each suggested approach
considered in the process will be tested for its ability to accommodate the
greatest number of interests while sacrificing the fewest. Reaching a con-
clusion about which is the best possible legislation should be made easier
through the use of this analysis.
Of course, no legislation will be proposed or evaluated until someone
identifies a problem area. Normally, such problems are presented to
legislators by constituents and other interested parties. A survey of court
decisions can also expose a need for reform or action either because a
* Ann H. Britton, B.A., Duke University; J.D., Georgetown University. Ms. Britton is
an Associate Professor at Delaware Law School of Widener University. Ms. Britton gives
special thanks to Professor Daniel H. Derby of Touro Law School for his comments and
suggestions on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. This matrix serves as a decision making device and draws on a combination of methods
used in Derby, An Analytical Framework for International Criminal Law: Realism and Interest
Alignment, I TouRo L. REV. 57 (1985) and Nagel, Using Microcomputers and
P/G% to Predict Court Cases, 18 AKRON L. REV. 541 (1985) (proposing a microcomputer
program to process a set of prior cases and predict the outcome of future cases).
2. This Article does not include coverage of a related, but distinct, issue; using physical
or psychological tests to screen out legally protected groups. For example, personality and
interest tests are questioned because of cultural bias in the tests that screen out female applicants.
Cf. Annotation, Requirement that Employee or Prospective Employee Take and Pass Physical
Examination as Unlawful Employment Practice Violative of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.), 36 A.L.R. FED. 721 (1986) (requirement of physical
examination is unlawful when used to discriminate against certain persons because it discloses
physical infirmities more prevalent in one sex than the other).
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court specifically requests legislative action or perceives a pattern of
difficult issues.
The specific cases precipitating this Article will be described over the
course of the discussion about permissible employer inquiries. In general,
the cases involve instances where an employer has fired an employee
because of false statements on an employment application concerning his
or her health, and instances where an employer has rejected an applicant
based on an answer concerning a handicapping condition.
A clarification of terms is in order. The author makes no distinction
between the terms "handicap" and "disability." The Rehabilitation Act
of 19731 defines a disability as a handicap only when it substantially
interferes with a major life activity.4 This definition can be fairly circular
when the real problem lies not in any particular medical manifestations,
but in the attitudinal barriers encountered by certain job applicants. For
many disabilities, these barriers can interfere with a person's job perform-
ance to a greater extent than the underlying disability itself. In order to
accommodate these attitudinal barriers, the statutory definition includes
those who are "regarded as having such an impairment," 5 or, in other
words, those who are perceived as being handicapped. 6 This Article will
use the terms handicap, impairment, and disability interchangeably, be-
cause so often the problems encountered in the pre-employment setting
are caused by employers' assumptions about the effects of mental or
physical conditions on job performance.
To evaluate the propriety of these assumptions, it is necessary to deter-
mine first exactly how much information about an applicant's physical
and mental condition an employer needs to evaluate suitability for a job.7
This determination is essential in deciding what questions a prospective
employer will be permitted to ask. "Ask" is used in its broadest sense of
obtaining information. The restrictions on employer inquiries apply to the
use of information obtained without deliberate effort (i.e., readily appar-
ent disabilities like a wheelchair or a seeing-eye dog), or those discovered
in a physical examination (i.e., evidence of surgery or blood and urine
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982).
4. Id. § 706 (7)(b).
5. Id.
6. See generally Osborne, The Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Protections for Victims of
Weight Discrimination, 29 UCLA L. REv. 947 (1982) (proposing that obesity should be regarded
as a physical handicap). For a perspective on the limits of this definition, see Hoffman,
Employment Discrimination Based on Cancer History: The Need for Federal Legislation, 59
TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1986), where it is argued that the Cancer Patients Employment Rights Act of
1985 (H.R. 1294, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)) is needed because existing legislation, including
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, does not adequately protect cancer survivors.
7. This question should be distinguished from asking how much information is needed
after employment is offered, e.g., to meet contingent health requirements, and how much is
needed after an employee is hired, e.g., to assist first aid personnel.
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test results). The restrictions apply to information solicited through spe-
cific questions about medical history 9 such as alcoholism, ulcers, diabetes,
coronary heart disease, and emotional disturbances.10 Regardless of how
they come to an employer's attention, all disabilities need protection from
the detrimental assumptions that may be drawn about their effect on job
performance.
I. IDENTIFYING THE INTERESTS AT STAKE
How much an employer may ask an applicant varies according to whose
interests are at stake. The first step in building a matrix to test the various
approaches to this question is to generate a list describing the interests of
job applicants, employers, other employees, insurance carriers, health care
providers, and the general public. Compiling this list also involves an
evaluation of the restrictions imposed on pre-employment inquiries by
various laws and regulations now in force. The appropriate starting point
for this inquiry is with the interests of the job applicant.
A. Interests of the Applicant
An applicant has an overriding interest in obtaining employment for
both financial and psychological rewards. The importance of this interest
can hardly be overestimated." An applicant needs to be free from inap-
propriate exclusion from work if he or she is to satisfy this primary
interest. Handicapped persons are often excluded from jobs because em-
ployers presume that a person's ability to perform a job or work safely
with others will be affected by a handicapping condition. Obtaining ac-
curate information about applicants' abilities and disabilities is critical to
assure that applicants are not excluded from work which they can safely
8. See, e.g., Note, Civil Rights: Termination of Employment for High Blood Pressure
Constitutes Prohibited Discrimination Under the California Fair Employment & Housing Act,
10 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 865 (1983).
9. See generally Comment, Hidden Handicaps: Protection of Alcoholics, Drug Addicts,
and the Mentally Ill Against Employment Discrimination Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
& the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 725 (discussing the burden of proof
and protections afforded employees with "hidden handicaps" and an employer's duty to
accommodate).
10. Interview with Philip L. Rothbart, M.D., J.D., Adjunct Professor, Delaware Law
School of Widener University, in Wilmington, Delaware (Apr. 15, 1987).
11. As the Supreme Court observed:
Insofar as a man is deprived of the right to labor his liberty is restricted ....
Liberty means more than freedom from servitude, and the constitutional guarantee
is an assurance that the citizen shall be protected in the right to use his powers of
mind and body in any lawful calling.
Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630, 636 (1914).
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and adequately perform. This information must then be placed in the
hands of employers who are the decision makers.' 2
The decision making process is complicated because it involves both an
intellectual component and often a strong emotional component that must
be addressed. 3 Public concern over the spread of contagious diseases 4
and employee use of controlled substances is an example of a strong
emotional component potentially affecting hiring decisions." These emo-
tional barriers are not unlike those that arise in the context of racial or
sexual discrimination. Not surprisingly, the same kinds of anti-discrimi-
nation requirements applied in those situations are also being applied to
disabled persons. ' 6
The attitudinal barriers can be quite pernicious. They have been shown
to be so resistant to change that one study concluded that subjective
emotions and denials of bias make employers "almost impervious to
conventional educational techniques designed to overcome the discrimi-
12. In a report of the Congressional Commission for the Control of Epilepsy and its
Consequences, entitled PLAN FOR NATIONWIDE ACTION ON EPILEPSY, it was noted:
Despite the dramatic advances in treatment and rehabilitation making it possible
for more than half of those with epilepsy to lead seizure-free lives, and another 35
to 40 percent to lead near-normal lives, and despite Federal legislation that prohibits
discrimination in hiring because of handicapping conditions, the number of un-
employed persons with epilepsy remains disproportionately high-over twice the
national average ....
Perhaps even greater-and far more difficult to measure-is the number who are
unemployed, working in low-paying, menial positions with little opportunity for
advancement or change simply because they can find nothing else. The result is an
immense waste of human potential among both those who have minimum disability
and those who are severely handicapped.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PUBLIC HEALTH SERIVCE, PLAN FOR NATIONWIDE
ACTION ON EPILEPSY 85, DHEW PUB. No. (NIH) 78-277 (1978).
13. For example, strong sentiments may be aroused where the applicant has cancer or
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Similarly, popularly associated characteristics
may be imputed, such as criminal tendencies in the mentally retarded or mental deficiencies in
the physically disabled.
14. See, e.g., Postell, AIDS: A Legal, Medical and Social Problem, 22 TRIAL 76 (Aug.
1986) (discussing blood testing and hiring of AIDS victims); see also School Bd. of Nassau Co.
v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (holding that persons suffering from contagious diseases are
handicapped and fall within the protection of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973), reh'g denied,
107 S. Ct. 1913 (1987).
15. See What ACLU Has To Say About . . . Drug Testing in The Workplace, 357 Cwv.
LIBERTIES 5 (Spring 1986); Chineson, Mandatory Drug Testing: An Invasion of Privacy?, 22
TRA. 91 (Sept. 1986) (drug testing in the workplace); Mandatory Drug Testing in the Workplace,
72 A.B.A. J. 34 (Aug. 1986) (arguing that civil liberties and workplace safety can best be
promoted through supervisor surveillance rather than mandatory testing).
16. See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of
Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 855 (1975) (handicapped persons merit special judicial attention within the equal
protection clause).
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nation.' 17 It may well be that legal remedies are the only real avenue
handicapped persons have for battling discrimination.
In addition to attitudinal barriers, other subtle pressures also work
against a handicapped job applicant. For example, those persons who
make the hiring decision are frequently unreliable. They may be misin-
formed and their judgment may suffer because they have not been trained
to make medical evaluations.'" Even where the decision is made by a
person with medical training, the applicant's condition may fall outside
his or her area of expertise. Likewise, even a professional is subject to
pressure to err on the side of conservative judgment. 9
Factors that work in an applicant's favor include privacy rights20 and
public policy encouraging self-determination. The public health interest
which seeks to prevent harm to an employee must be balanced against
these rights and policies which allow for the self-determination of exposure
to risk, a right especially important to handicapped persons who have
been subjected to years of paternalistic attitudes. 2' Part of the concept of
equal opportunity is the option to try new opportunities, including those
17. Sands & Zalkind, Effects of an Educational Campaign to Change Attitudes Toward
Hiring Epileptics, 13 EPILEPSI 87, 94 (1972).
18. "Evaluating the meaning of past treatment is an ominous assignment for any mental
health professional, and for the untrained person, virtually impossible." National Association
of Social Workers, Inc., Statement in Reference to the Matter of Jean Ross' Certification for
the New Jersey Bar 2. See also Kovarsky & Hauck, Arbitration and the Epileptic, 28 LAB. L.J.
597 (Sept. 1977) (noting the difficulties arbitrators encounter in making medical judgments).
19. In an amicus curiae brief filed in Glassman v. New York Medical College, 64 Misc. 2d
466, 315 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1970), it was argued:
If the psychiatrist recommends admission of an applicant who subsequently has
difficulties, he will be visably [sic] and dramatically confronted by his mistaken
judgment and perhaps by the criticism of his colleagues in the admission office and
on the faculty. If, on the other hand, he erroneously recommends rejection of the
applicant, he will never be confronted with error. This is so because the rejected
applicant will never have an opportunity to demonstrate that the psychiatrist's
judgement was wrong.
Amicus curiae Brief for the American Orthopsychiatric Association at 18, Glassman v. New
York Medical College, 64 Misc. 2d 466, 351 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1970), reprinted in, 1 LEGAL RIGHTS
OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 77, 96-97 (B. Ennis & P. Freidman ed. 1974).
20. See generally A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (discussing individual's right
to determine what information about him is disclosed); Beardley, Privacy: Autonomy and
Selective Pisclosure in Privacy, in NoMos XIII 56 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman ed. 1971) (looking
at the norms of privacy).
21. The developing concept of a "right to risk" can be traced out in the controversy
surrounding the repeal of laws which require motorcyclists to wear protective helmets and the
controversy over mandatory use of seat belts and other automotive devices. See Carter, Auto
Safety: Coleman to Act on Controversial Air Bag Issue, 193 Scl. 1219 (Sept. 24, 1976); Haddon,
Passive vs. Active Approaches to Reducing Human Wastage 15 (Newsletter of the American
College of Preventive Medicine No. 2 1974), reprinted in, J. TRAUMA (Apr. 1974); INSURANCE
INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, STATUS REPORT, VOI. 10, No. 11 (June 18, 1975).
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also carrying a risk of failure.22 As a society, we do not want to risk being
"protected" to the extent that we lose our freedom.
In general, certain protective measures are necessary to assure safe
working conditions. 23 It must be kept in mind, however, that it is impos-
sible to reduce the probability of work related accidents to zero, and a
standard which comes close to this ideal may prove unreasonable. 24 For
example, in Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission,25 the Iowa
Supreme Court held that it was unreasonable to fire a cafeteria worker
who had epilepsy because she could have been assigned to washing dishes,
working the cash register, and clearing tables, thereby avoiding any risks
associated with working near the grill. 26
The growing body of privacy rights also offers some protection to job
applicants. Privacy rights may be implicated whenever information is
required to be disclosed. 27 Because it is difficult to identify abuses and
22. As one writer points out:
Most disabled children have their lives programmed for them by teachers, parents,
therapists and doctors. Making independent decisions and dealing with the conse-
quences may be new experiences for the disabled young adult. It was pointed out
to me by one disabled young woman that she felt that people were always trying
to protect her and that she was never given a chance to 'fail.' She felt that if she
had been given the freedom to fail and recover early in life that she would have
been better prepared to take the risks necessary for a full adult life.
DIEBLER, SERVICE NEEDS AND PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED YOUNG ADULTS 9 (DD
Themes and Issues, No. 7, Chapel Hill, N.C., Jan. 1977).
23. Common law protections, such as those applied in Tucker v. Missouri & K. Tel. Co.,
132 Mo. App. 418, 112 S.W. 6 (1908) (recognizing cause of action against employer for negligent
employment and retention of incompetent fellow-servant), have been supplanted by legislation,
i.e., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982), and state worker's
compensation statutes. Cf. In re Collingsworth, 17 N.C. App. 340, 194 S.E.2d 210 (1973)
(denying unemployment compensation to man fired for not wearing safety equipment; the
employee said he was "willing to take the risk").
24. In a study to test the validity of rejecting borderline neuropsychiatric cases from military
service, the author concluded, "If screening were to weed out anybody who might develop a
psychiatric disorder, it would be necessary to weed out everybody." Berelin, Psychiatric Aspects
of Military Manpower Conservation, I I Am. J. PSYCH. 37, 94 (1954). In Rhodes v. Longview
Fibre Co., 2 Mental Disability L. Rep. (BNA) 14 (1977), the court noted that the level of
hazard had been so over-emphasized by the employer that it appears that anyone subject to a
sneeze would bring swift disaster in the mill. Likewise, Gerald Cohen, the arbitrator in Samuel
Bingham Co. & Teamsters Local 688, 1 Mental Disability L. Rep. (BNA) 268 (1976-1977),
declined to elevate safety to the status of a sacred cow.
25. 318 N.W.2d 162 (Iowa 1982).
26. Id. at 169. The court upheld a hearing officer's determination that the worker's discharge
was not based upon the nature of her occupation, reinstated the officer's decision to rehire the
worker, and awarded back pay minus unemployment compensation benefits received. The court
stated that the evidence did not warrant the conclusion that the worker's epileptic condition
presented a risk of danger to herself or others that could not reasonably be accommodated as
required by law. Id.
27. Beardley, supra note 20, at 56. The disclosure of "private information about the plaintiff,
even though it is true and no action would lie for defamation," is actionable as an invasion
of privacy. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 856 (5th ed. 1984).
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obtain redress from those who violate a person's privacy, a strong public
interest exists in denying access to information for those who have no
need for it. In the case of a public employer, or any employer who is
acting as an agent of the state, there must be a compelling state interest
before violating an applicant's right to privacy. Private employers, on the
other hand, may be liable for the common law tort of invasion of privacy
if they abuse the information entrusted to them.
The likelihood of an invasion of privacy and the wrongful use of
information by employers is increased by the use of collection systems
that misrepresent an applicant's condition because the information is
erroneous, incomplete, or outdated. 2 For example, does consultation with
a guidance counselor or minister constitute treatment for a mental or
emotional disorder? What if a diagnosis is made but the condition is so
mild that no treatment is prescribed or necessary? 29 An employer may be
liable for defamation if incorrect information about an applicant's con-
dition is circulated.30 If the employment is in the public sector, the addi-
tional constitutional protection governing state action may protect against
invasions of privacy and the inappropriate use of an applicant's condition
in the hiring process. 3
In summary, the interests of job applicants include: (1) an opportunity
to secure financially and psychically rewarding work; (2) freedom from
attitudinal barriers and presumptions based on ignorance or emotions
about their ability to perform tasks; (3) the right to a measure of self-
28. In recognition of the need for individuals to correct or update information held
concerning them, Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (amended 1984).
29. This can happen when tests for certain antibodies are positive, i.e., a positive tuberculin
skin test coupled with inconclusive x-rays.
30. With laboratory test accuracy rates as low as thirty-three percent, inaccurate reports are
likely. Chineson, supra note 15, at 91. In Cowper v. Vannier, 20 II1. App. 2d 499, 156 N.E.2d
761 (1959), the court held that the statement "Mr. Cowper is recovering from a mental illness"
printed in a newsletter was defamatory.
31. In Spencer v. Toussaint, 408 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D. Mich. 1976), the plaintiffs brought
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), and unsuccessfully argued that,
in denying employment based on prior history of mental illness, the defendants
impose an impermissible conclusive presumption on the class, thus denying plaintiffs
due process of law. Third, they maintain that to deny persons who 'have been
treated, voluntarily or involuntarily, for alleged or proven mental illness and who
subsequently have been discharged from treatment or declared restored to soundness
of mind by the State,' employment because of past mental illness while not examining
other applicants to determine their mental health is a denial of equal protection,
or of a due process right to fair consideration for public employment.
Id. at 1070-71. The court observed that the applicants had only been disqualified only from
service as bus drivers, and held that due process hearings were not required because the plaintiffs
were foreclosed only from a narrow range of employment opportunities. Id. at 1072. For cases
where similar arguments were made, see Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J.
1986); Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. City of Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d 937, 719 P.2d
660, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1986); Patchoque-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ. 70
N.Y.2d 57, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456, 510 N.E.2d 325 (1987).
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determination as to what risks will be assumed; (4) reasonable safety
precautions that do not unreasonably exclude handicapped workers; and
(5) the protection of privacy rights in information revealed to employers.
B. Interests of the Employer
Primarily, an employer needs to know if an applicant has the ability to
perform the tasks required by the job. Federal law limits employment to
"otherwise qualified" applicants. Otherwise qualified applicants are de-
scribed in the regulations as those applicants who are able to perform the
tasks identified as essential to the position once reasonable accommoda-
tions have been made.32 Generally, state laws are interpreted consistently
with this description.3 3 No one seriously proposes that unqualified appli-
cants should be hired.
At the outset, the problem lies in determining what skills or abilities
are essential elements of specific positions so that "otherwise qualified"
applicants can be identified. Employer safety manuals 3 4 and requests to
hire aliens may be a ready source of such information. Another source is
the thousands of individual job descriptions maintained by the United
States Department of Labor.3
In addition to matching a person's abilities to a particular position, an
employer needs certain information from applicants to comply with the
statutory requirements of affirmative action 6 and veteran's preference.17
An employer also needs the specific information to make reasonable
accommodations for disabilities9 and to maintain a safe workplace,3 9
32. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1987); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1987).
33. For example, in In re Montgomery Ward & Co., 280 Or. 163, 570 P.2d 76 (1977), the
court concluded that the Handicapped Persons Civil Right Act, OR. REv, STAT. § 659.425
(1985):
impose[d] upon an employer the obligation not to reject a prospective employee
because of a physical or mental handicap unless there is, because of the defect, a
probability either that the employee cannot do the job in a satisfactory manner or
that he can do so only at the risk of incapacitating himself. The 'fullest participation
in the ... economic life of the state' and the 'reasonable demands of the position'
would seem to require no less a standard.
Id. at 168-69, 570 P.2d at 79.
34. A. FRAGOMEN, JR. & S. BELL, IMMIGRATION PRIMER 43 (1985).
35. EMPLOYMENT & TRAiNINo ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL
TITLES (4th ed. 1977).
36. For example, employers with contracts in excess of $2500 with any federal department
or agency must take affirmative action to employ ard advance in employment qualified
handicapped individuals. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1982). See also 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1982) (requiring
federal agencies to implement affirmative action plans); 45 C.F.R. § 84.1 1(a)(2) (1987) (requiring
"positive steps" to employ the handicapped).
37. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-30-107 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14.02.4-11 (1983).
38. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1987) (federal contractors); 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1987) (recipients
of federal grants).
39. Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1)-(13) (1982).
[Vol. 37:1
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including those safety measures required by union contracts.4 0 Well defined
job requirements are at the heart of efforts to meet safety requirements
and provide reasonable accommodations for handicapped applicants."' An
employer may also need the information to comply with statutes protecting
the public health by restricting who may work in certain positions.
42
The usefulness of complete, accurate, and easily accessible information
cannot be underestimated. However, an employer needs to obtain this
information in a reasonably low-cost manner. An extensive physical ex-
amination of each applicant would be prohibitively expensive, as would
be the services of experts to determine a person's ability to perform a job.
Costs associated with an expert evaluation of practical accommodations
for particular disabilities would also be prohibitive. At the same time,
however, an employer cannot afford to have a selection system that
bypasses too many qualified applicants.
Once an employer determines the essential elements of a position, his
next problem is to determine whether the applicant will be able to perform.
In the past, various aptitude and intelligence tests have been relied upon
to make this determination. However, these tests must be carefully ad-
ministered and interpreted within informed guidelines because they have
been shown to be unreliable in the context of race discrimination. 43 These
guidelines will prove helpful in setting testing procedures for handicapped
applicants because they demonstrate the pitfalls that should be avoided
and reflect the attitude of the courts which have evaluated testing proce-
dures.
A final, and significant, concern of employers is the possibility of
increased costs from absenteeism and insurance if disabled persons join
the work force. In Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Department of Industry,
40. Federal contractors must notify unions with which they have collective bargaining
agreements that they are bound by law to take affirmative action. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.4(e)
(1987). Likewise, recipients of federal financial assistance cannot participate in contracts or
relationships, including labor unions, if it would discriminate against handicapped applicants.
See 45 C.F.R. § 84.1l(a)(4),(c) (1987).
41. The issue is similar to determining the bona fide occupational qualifications in sex and
religious discrimination cases. See Lang, Protecting the Handicapped from Employment Dis-
crimination: The Job-Relatedness and Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Doctrines, 27
DEPAuI. L. REV. 989 (1978) (arguing that the doctrines used in Title VII Civil Rights adjudi-
cations can be applied to discrimination against the handicapped).
42. E.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 71, § 55B (Law. Co-op. 1986) (prohibiting employment in
any public or private school of anyone with tuberculosis). The City of Miami requires food
service workers to certify that they do not carry infectious disease. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26 1985,
at 30, col. 1, cited in Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1274, 1274 n.3 (1986).
43. See B.L. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 6-10 (1983);
GOLDSTEIN, FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAW AND THE USE OF TESTING IN MAKING EMPLOYMENT DEci-
SIONS: An Introductory Outline Of Major Issues And Concepts, NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc. (1977).
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Labor & Human Relations,44 a Wisconsin court objected to speculation
as to such costs because,
[a]t no point in this case did Chrysler contend that the complainant was
unable to perform, at the standards set by the employer, the duties
required by the job. Instead, the petitioner based his decision on the
risk of future absenteeism and the higher insurance cost. Neither of
these factors constitute a legal basis for discriminating against com-
plainant.4
The same court also rejected as immaterial the contention that the
complainant may at some future date be unable to perform his job.4 6 In
sum, decisions such as Chrysler point to the need not only for reliable
information about possible insurance and absenteeism costs, but also to
the overall concern of employers to contain costs by being able to make
hiring decisions based upon relevant and complete information about a
potential employee.
C. Interests of the Insurance Industry
Insurance carriers, as well as employers, are interested in the possibility
of increased insurance costs for handicapped employees because of the
expenses of illness or accidents they would bear. Efforts by insurance
carriers to protect their interests and intervene in the employment process
are hampered, however, by the risk of liability for tortious interference
with the business relationship between employer and employee. 47
Workers' compensation and disability insurance carriers want to mini-
mize job accidents and maintain employee health. Accordingly, both such
carriers would rather err on the side of not hiring in order to meet those
goals. Both types of carriers, on the other hand, also seek to rehire or
otherwise return to work previously injured employees, who are referred
to as the "newly handicapped," as soon as possible to reduce the period
of disability.
44. 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 344 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976) (construing Wisconsin law).
45. Id. at 345.
46. Id.
47. See Hickman v. Winston County Hosp. Bd., 508 So. 2d 237 (Ala. 1987). The Hickman
court outlined the prima facie case for tortious interference with a business or contract
relationship. The elements are:
(1) The existence of a contract or business relation;
(2) defendant's knowledge of the contract or business relation;
(3) intentional interference by the defendant in the contract or business relation;
and
(4) damage to the plaintiff as a result of defendant's interference.
Id. at 238 (quoting Lowder Realty, Inc. v. Odom, 495 So. 2d 23, 25 (Ala. 1986)).
The Hickman court held that the tortious conduct must be conducted by a third party,
outside of the business relationship. Id. Any interference by an insurance company in this
context would fit the requirement of the rule outlined by the Hickman court.
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Also, health and hospitalization carriers want workers' health and safety
maintained. In order to contain costs, these carriers may require coverage
waivers for employees with pre-existing conditions. The usefulness of such
waivers is limited, however, since most often these carriers will be provid-
ing group policies. Under group policies, detailed inquiries about an
individual applicant are not particularly useful because the health of an
employee's dependents will be more determinative of the carrier's exposure
to risk. Furthermore, predictions of future health for individuals are better
made from information concerning the individual's family medical history
than with only the individual's history.
Another group of insurers, liability insurance carriers, are interested in
reducing the possibility of accidents to third parties. Liability carriers are
concerned about increased risks of injury to customers, or perhaps other
motorists involved in traffic accidents, caused by a handicapped employee
while on company business. Hospitals and other health care providers
have related concerns because they must absorb the costs of health care
for both the applicant and the other members of the public who have
neither insurance nor adequate income.
D. Interests of the General Public
Members of the public in general are concerned about the potentially
double-edged tax burdens associated with the denial of jobs to "otherwise
qualified" applicants. Not only is there the risk of increased taxes to fund
unemployment, disability, and welfare benefits, but there is the burden of
reduced tax revenue occasioned by less than full employment. The potential
disability and welfare benefits include increased costs of Social Security
Disability Insurance, food stamps, housing assistance, Medicaid, voca-
tional rehabilitation, and job training and placement services. In addition
to tax burdens, the public, as well as the potential co-workers of the
applicant, have an interest in avoiding any threats to safety when in the
presence of a handicapped worker. 48
II. EVALUATING CURRENT LIMITS ON PRE-EMPLOYMENT INQUIRIES
Having described the sometimes competing, sometimes concurrent in-
terests of applicants, employers, insurers, and the general public, an
analysis of the problems encountered by applicants will reveal whether
these interests are optimally accommodated under the existing regulations
and limitations which apply to pre-employment inquiries.
The application and interviewing process may present an applicant with
difficult choices. When confronted with specific choices, an applicant may
choose to answer truthfully or falsely, but sometimes the questions are so
vague that a meaningful response is difficult. There are many examples
48. See supra note 42.
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of individuals who did not disclose medical information out of fear of
rejection, only to be fired later for falsifying their job application.4 9
Employers usually rationalize this practice by claiming that it serves to
weed out dishonest employees. The rationale could be applied as well to
any information which is not a justifiable concern to the employer such
as a person's political or sexual preferences.5 0 The rationale has even been
used to fire employees who had been satisfactorily performing their jobs."
The practice of firing persons on the basis of false information in an
application, however, is not only both over- and underinclusive, but fails
to take into account the individual's right to withhold irrelevant or un-
necessary information.
The ability to fire a person who gives false information on an application
may be limited by legal doctrines and restrictions followed in other areas
of the law. False statements are the very heart of misrepresentation cases,
and the problems presented by false statements also arise in the context
of insurance and will cases. The overarching theme is that a false statement
must also be material to justify adverse action.5 2 The "false and material"
test limits the consequences which may be imposed upon those who give
false information and could be applied to cases involving handicapped
applicants.
In addition to the false and material test, it is instructive to look at
restrictions developed to prevent employment discrimination for reasons
other than an applicant's medical condition. 3 These restrictions, for in-
stance, may prohibit questions about whether an applicant has an arrest
record54 or whether an applicant has children." The theme that unites
49. See EPILEPSY FOUND. OF AM., ANSWERS TO THE MOST FREQUENT QUESTIONS PEOPLE ASK
ABOUT EPILEPSY 13 (1977). See also Kovarsky & Hauck, supra note 18, at 604-05.
50. Contra Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (state may refuse admission
to bar where applicant refuses to answer questions about political affiliations since it thwarted
a full investigation into qualifications).
51. See Horizon Mining Co., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1171 (1979) (LeWinter, Arb.) (employer
may not discharge employee who had lied about prior injury on application when the employer
had recalled employee back to work following an injury); Iowa Beer & Liquor Control Dep't
v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 896 (Iowa 1983) (falsifying of a job application
does not preclude finding of disability discrimination).
52. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 753 (5th ed. 1984) (misrepresentation); I PAGE ON WILLS § 14.3 (rev. ed. 1960); 2
RICHARDS ON INSURANCE §§ 306, 322 (W. Freedman 5th ed. 1952); Gomogda v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 501 P.2d 756, 758 (Colo. App. 1972).
53. See, e.g., Schreiber, Employment Applications- What Massachusetts Employers Can
and Cannot Ask, 65 MASS. L. REV. 69 (1980) (reviewing state and federal limits on inquiries
into marital status, pregnancy and children, height and weight, finances, relatives, education,
criminal records, military records and security clearances, religion, handicaps and mental health,
and citizenship).
54. See Genz, Employer's Use of Criminal Records under Title VII, 29 CATH. U.L. REV.
597 (1980); B.L. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 43, at 173.
55. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1970) (reversing grant of summary
judgment for defendants where employer indicated it would not hire women with pre-school-
age children, but did employ similarly situated men).
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these restrictions is job relevance. 6 Court decisions have developed a
language for discussing whether the features of a job are material, in other
words, whether the information requested is essential to the job. Such job
essentials are commonly referred to as bona fide occupational qualifica-
tions (BFOQs).5 7
Another principle borrowed from other discrimination cases is that of
selective enforcement of administrative policies. Selective enforcement
would "tend to screen out" the handicapped." For example, an inference
of selective enforcement would be warranted if individuals were fired for
falsifying their job applications with respect to medical information, but
were not fired for having given other false information. 9 A strong, but
so far unsuccessful, argument has been made for considering the handi-
capped a suspect class. 60 If this argument succeeds, then courts would
apply strict scrutiny to claims of discrimination which would afford hand-
icapped persons a greater measure of protection.
A. Existing Case Law
The question of whether a false statement is material, and thus justifies
discharge, has frequently arisen in cases involving workers with epilepsy.
In the context of arbitration, it has been observed:
Some arbitrators-the number appears to be increasing-recognize the
reason for denial and 'forgive' the 'white lie.' In other words, lying is
not 'just cause' for discharge-the punishment does not fit the crime-
given the needless industrial hostility faced by epileptics.6l
In Casias v. Industrial Commission of Colorado6 a denial of unem-
ployment benefits could not, standing alone, be based on the employee's
discharge for concealing a history of epilepsy on his employment appli-
cation. The employee knew that his seizures were controlled by medication
56. Cf. Williams v. Boorstin, 633 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (upholding firing of black man
who had falsely claimed to have a law degree as not racially motivated), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
985 (1981).
57. See Lang, supra note 41, at 992.
58. Federal contractors are required to:
review ... all physical and mental job qualification requirements to insure that, to
the extent qualification requirements tend to screen out qualified handicapped
individuals, they are consistent with business necessity and safe performance of the
job.
41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c) (1987) (emphasis added). See also 45 C.F.R. § 84.13(a) (1987) (recipients
of federal grants must not use selection criteria that "screens out or tends to screen out
handicapped persons" unless certain exceptions are met).
59. Cf. East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 340 n.7 (5th Cir. 1975) (employer cannot justify
refusal to hire based upon extensive investigation into work record if he conducts only limited
investigation into work record of other applicants).
60. See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 16.
61. Kovarsky & Hauck, supra note 18, at 605 (citations omitted).
62. 38 Colo. App. 261, 554 P.2d 1357 (1976).
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and would not affect his job performance. In fact, the employer only
learned of the condition when a physician treated the employee for an on-
the-job accident unrelated to the epilepsy. The Casias court required the
false statements to be material before it would deny unemployment ben-
efits. 63
Materiality can only be determined with knowledge of both the essential
job requirements and the acceptable level of safety. Apparently suspicious
of employer's exaggerated claims for safety, the arbitrator in Samuel
Bingham Co. & Teamsters Local 68864 declined to elevate safety to the
status of sacred cow. 6 In a similar case, Kovarsky and Hauck note:
[TJhe arbitrator in Whitney Chain reasoned that an epileptic should be
permitted to fill any job which is no more hazardous than conditions
encountered daily away from the plant. While this conclusion is debat-
able, at least to some extent, the arbitrator was more in tune with
current medical opinion than others.
66
Other courts have also recognized the need to acknowledge that absolute
safety cannot be attained, and that the critical determinant is present
ability rather than past medical conditions. 67
Irrebuttable presumptions may also be used to discriminate against
persons with potentially handicapping conditions. Automatic exclusion of
a person with controlled epilepsy from a police position, 68 automatic
exclusion of all diabetics from working in a shipyard, 69 and automatic
63. Id. at 264, 554 P.2d at 1360. Accord Roundtree v. Board of Review, 4 Ill. App. 3d
695, 281 N.E.2d 360 (1972) (denial of prior felony conviction constituted misconduct connected
with work because the applicant was employed as security guard); Collins v. Cherry Manor
Convalescent Center, 7 Kan. App. 2d 270, 640 P.2d 875 (1982) (handicapped employee's state
of mind determinative of whether she "knowingly" misrepresented her condition); Krauzer v.
Farmland Indus., Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 107, 626 P.2d 1223 (1981) (accidental or mistaken
misrepresentation of health is not a "knowingly" made misrepresentation). See also Annotation,
Right to Unemployment Compensation as Affected by Misrepresentation in Original Employ-
ment Application, 23 A.L.R. 4th 1272 (1983).
64. 1 Mental Disability L. Rep. 268 (BNA) (1976-1977).
65. Id.
66. Kovarsky & Hauck, supra note 18, at 604.
67. See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
68. The Court is of the opinion that the Medical Standards sweep too broadly and
include within their ambit those individuals, like the plaintiff, whose history of
epilepsy in no way infringes upon their present ability to perform the duties and
tasks required by the position to which they have applied. Thus, . . .the absolute
presumption established by standard K(4)(a) as applied to the plaintiff is violative
of his due process rights.
Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75, 77-78 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
69. In Fraser Shipyards v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 13 Empl.
Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11,515 (Wis. 1976), the court observed:
The petitioner vigorously argues that because its expert testimony indicates that
some diabetics may be a substantial hazard to themselves or fellow employees when
working as welders in a shipyard, all diabetics may be disqualified from potential
employment as a welder in that industry. This is precisely the type of rationale that
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rejection of former drug users from municipal employment,70 have all
been struck down.7'
In one case, the Federal Aviation Administration was not permitted to
presume that a hearing-impaired Air Traffic Control Specialist would be
unable to use the phone in a high noise level atmosphere, but instead had
to determine his abilities when he used a hearing aid. 72 Likewise, a railroad
had to reinstate an employee with back pay, because it had failed to
establish whether color blindness precluded satisfactory performance in a
fireman's post. 73 Substantive due process is denied when employment
decisions are based on information unrelated to present ability to perform
the duties of a particular position. 74 Procedural due process is denied by
vague and overbroad restrictions on employment. 75
In Spencer v. Toussaint,7 6 plaintiffs argued that inquiry was made only
about past mental health records as opposed to present ability to perform
the duties of a position with the municipal transportation authority. The
court responded that administering psychological tests for present func-
tioning "might well be desired but it is not constitutionally required. The
fact that the method results in some inequality does not authorize the
Court to establish a superior one." ' 77 At the time of the Spencer decision,
the same employer, the City of Detroit, had been conducting current
the Wisconsin Fair Employment Law is designed to overcome .... While the
petitioner did demonstrate that individual diabetics may be unqualified ... because
of a history of blackouts or ... [severe disability] . . . . the petitioner made no
such showing with these claimants.
70. Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding as overbroad and irrational
regulation barring former drug users from city employment without considering each case
individually).
71. Contra Boynton Cab. Co. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 96
Wis. 2d 396, 291 N.W.2d 850 (1980) (upholding refusal to hire taxi driver with only one hand
despite the fact that an inexpensive device could have easily been added to cab without sacrificing
passenger safety).
72. Crane v. Lewis, 551 F. Supp. 27 (D.D.C. 1983).
73. Quinn v. Southern Pac. Trans. Co., 76 Or. App. 617, 711 P.2d 139 (1986).
74. The disclosure of all medical and psychological treatment records to a state board of
bar examiners has been distinguished as not violative of substantive due process because a
privilege, not a right was at stake. Thus, in Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re Applicant, 443
So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983), the court concluded that no constitutional rights of a bar applicant,
including due process rights, privacy rights, or psychotherapist-patient privileges, were violated
by the state bar's required release of such records. Id. at 76. See Comment, Constitutional
Law: Does a Privacy Right Protect a Bar Applicant's Mental Health Records from Complete
Disclosure, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 537 (1984).
75. See, e.g., Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1274,
1279 (1986) (public hysteria and misconceptions about AIDS virus may result in policies that
deny constitutional freedoms to AIDS carriers and homosexuals). But see New York Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (finding constitutional a blanket exclusion of methadone
users from eligibility for employment with transit authority until applicants completed drug
treatment program; distinction was rational and not a pretext for discrimination).
76. 408 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
77. Id. at 1074.
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psychological testing for other positions, specifically, law enforcement.
This decision is directly contrary to the federal regulations expressly
adopted to discourage discrimination against certain governmental em-
ployees. 78 Since most transportation authorities receive federal financial
assistance, they should use hiring practices that accord with federal re-
gulations. 79 Unfortunately for the claimant, as well as others, the issue
was not tried.
The importance of using the present capabilities of an applicant instead
of some past occurrence seems to be a difficult attitudinal barrier to
overcome.8 0 In their review of twenty-eight published arbitration awards
involving epilepsy, Kovarsky and Hauck discovered, "Only a few of the
arbitrators seemed cognizant of the need to consider [the degree of seizure]
control. While safety was important in twenty-five of the grievances, none
of the arbitrators making decisions indicated that the probability of seizure
on the job was considered."'" Federal and state legislation, and occasion-
ally local ordinances, 2 address to some degree the problem of overcoming
the barriers that prevent the evaluation of applicants based upon their
current ability to perform a job.
B. Federal Statutory Restrictions On Pre-Employment Inquiries
The principal federal statute that governs employment of handicapped
persons is the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.83 Generally, the Act prohibits
employment discrimination based upon handicap. Its provisions, which
are commonly referred to by their section numbers, cover various em-
ployers: section 501 covers the federal government as an employer;14 section
503 covers employers with government contracts in excess of $2500;83 and
section 504 covers recipients of federal financial assistance such as grants
and subsidies.8 6 The Act defines "handicapped person" as one who (1)
78. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
79. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6. Epileptics whose seizures are under control by
medication frequently encounter this barrier. For example, in Chicago & Northwest R.R. v.
Labor & Indus. Comm'n, 98 Wis. 2d 592, 297 N.W.2d 819 (1980), the court held that there
was sufficient evidence to support the commission's determination that a welder's epileptic
seizure disorder did not pose a reasonable hazard on the date of his disqualification from
employment.
81. Kovarsky & Hauck, supra note 18, at 603.
82. See, e.g., Fair Practices Act, PHILADELPHIA, PA, CODE ch. 9-1100 (1982).
83. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
84. Id. § 791.
85. Id. § 793.
86. Id. § 794. See Annotation, Construction and Effect of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 (29 U.S. C. § 794) Prohibiting Discrimination Against Otherwise Qualified Handicapped
Individuals in Specified Programs or Activities, 44 A.L.R. FED. 148 (1979); Wegner, The
Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Hand-
icap Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 401 (1984)
(arguing that section 504 is a useful tool for advancing Congress's equal opportunity objective,
however, it is not fully understood by the courts who treat the mandate as unitary rather than
multifaceted).
[Vol. 37:1
PRE-EMPLO YMENT INQUIRIES
has a physical or mental impairment substantially limiting a major life
activity, (2) has a record of such impairment, or (3) is regarded as having
such an impairment.8 7 Major life activities involve daily functions such as
caring for oneself, walking, talking, seeing, learning, and working. 8
The regulations issued by the then existing Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (DHEW) to implement section 504 served as the
model for other government agencies.8 9 As these were the model regula-
tions, and since DHEW was the major donor of federal grants, these
regulations have been the subject of numerous court decisions. Both the
DHEW regulations and those promulgated by the Department of Labor's
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs for section 503 limit
pre-employment inquiries.
Section 503 regulations include suggested personnel procedures to achieve
compliance with the regulations.9" As part of their affirmative action
obligation, federal contractors must review their personnel processes and
review physical and mental job qualifications. "[T]o the extent that qual-
ification requirements tend to screen out qualified handicapped indivi-
duals," they must be job related and consistent with business necessity
and safe performance of the job.91 There is no objective way to determine
whether or not the motives of an employer who seeks information about
medical conditions are for purposes of affirmative action. Regulations
under the Act address this uncertainty by placing the burden on the federal
contractor "to demonstrate that it has complied with the requirements of
this paragraph." 92
Section 504 regulations specifically prohibit pre-employment medical
examinations or inquiries except under specific enumerated situations. 93
Recipients of federal financial assistance "may not make use of any
employment test or other selection criterion that screens out handicapped
persons" unless the criterion is job related, and the alternatives that do
not screen out or tend to screen out applicants are unavailable. 94 Section
504 does permit an employer to condition an offer of employment on the
results of a medical examination, provided, however, that all applicants
are subject to the requirement. 95
87. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982); 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1987); 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(a) (1987).
88. 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(2) (1987); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1987).
89. The responsibility for coordinating consistency of regulations among various government
agencies under section 504 has since been transferred to the Department of Justice. Exec. Order
No. 12,250, 3 C.F.R. 298 (1980). Final Department of Justice rules can be found at 28 C.F.R.
§§ 41, 42 (1987).
90. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(b) (1987).
91. Id. § 60-741.6(c).
92. Id. § 60.741.6(c)(2).
93. 45 C.F.R. § 84.14 (1987).
94. Id. § 84.13(a).
95. Id. § 84.14(c).
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Both sections limit disclosure of the information to: (1) supervisors and
managers who will need the information to determine what reasonable
accommodations and restrictions are necessary; (2) first aid and safety
personnel, if needed to provide for possible emergencies; and (3) govern-
ment officials investigating compliance with the Act. 96 In other words, the
release of the information is always contingent upon a specific need to
know. If there are no job related consequences, but the information is
needed to guard against emergencies, then only first aid personnel, not
supervisors or managers, may be told. 97 Similarly, first aid personnel are
not to be informed where only job restructuring is required. 98
One of the differences between federal contractors and recipients of
federal grants is that the latter may, but are not required to, invite
disclosure of conditions that may invoke the statute's protection.99 In
neither case, however, is the employer authorized to compel disclosure.
In order to make this voluntary disclosure meaningful, applicants should
be given some sort of summary of the affirmative action program and the
reasons why disclosure of certain information is sought. Without this, the
individual lacks the information necessary to make an informed choice
about whether to release the information.
One suggestion offered in the regulations to avoid this problem is for
the employer to state: (1) the purpose of asking for the information; (2)
the intended use; (3) whether giving the information is mandatory or
voluntary; (4) and the consequences of not complying with the request.'°°
A second practice is to assure applicants that the reports filed for affir-
mative action purposes will not contain references by which the applicant
could be identified. 101 To this end, the affirmative action could be requested
on a sheet separate from the application.'1 2 If either of these practices is
followed, consent should be obtained for any additional uses of the
information.
Occasionally attempts are made to distinguish between situations in-
volving a medically trained interviewer as opposed to ordinary personnel
officers. In reality, this distinction is not valid because the medical officer
is an agent of the employer and the issues remain the same. As one
commentator observed:
While the acceptance of this medical testimony is proper and entitled
to careful evaluation, arbitrators are aware, or should be aware, that
company doctors testifying are expected to display allegiance to the
firm. Many company doctors are unnecessarily conservative when eval-
96. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c)(3) (1987); 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(d) (1987).
97. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c)(3)(i) (1987); 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(d)(1) (1987).
98. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c)(3)(ii) (1987); 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(d)(2) (1987).
99. 45 C.F.R. § 48.14(b) (1987).
100. 5 U.S.C. § 522a(e)(3) (1982); 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(b) (1987).
101. 5 U.S.C. § 522a(b)(5) (1982); 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(d) (1987).
102. 45 C.F.R. § 84.14(d) (1987).
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uating employees, choosing to err on the side of their employers.03
Furthermore, the medical officer will not have expertise in the full range
of medical evaluations that arise, since psychiatry, neurology, cardiology,
endocrinology, and other medical specialties are likely to be involved in
a full evaluation of an applicant with a medical condition.
Use of an employment agency to make the initial interview does not
free the employer from responsibility or change the issues since the agency
acts as an agent for the employer. 0 4 An agency may also be a state
employment service which receives federal financial assistance, and, there-
fore, would be limited by section 503 and other federal regulations. An
agency may be considered a federal subcontractor if it makes too many
placements with federal contractors, and likewise, subject to section 504
restrictions. In no event may a section 503 employer continue to use an
agency that has discriminated against handicapped applicants because to
do so would amount to use of a personnel procedure that would screen
out or tend to screen out handicapped applicants.105
Another employer practice that could be used to evade the Act is
requiring a handicapped applicant to waive insurance or sick pay benefits.
This practice violates the requirement that employees receive equal bene-
fits.106 These practices, and others like them, must be closely monitored
or restricted to prevent discrimination against handicapped applicants.
Overall, the Rehabilitation Act is a remedial statute that must be liberally
construed to counter any hiring practices that circumvent its goals.10 7
C. State Statutory Protection of Applicants
A variety of state statutes and regulations address the problem of the
permissible scope of pre-employment inquiries. Most states have provisions
103. Kovarsky & Hauck, supra note 18, at 602.
104. Under regulations formulated by the Department of Health and Human Services, a
recipient of federal monies thereunder cannot participate in a contractual relationship with
employment or referral agencies if the effect is discrimination against the handicapped. 45
C.F.R. § 84.11(a)(4) (1987).
105. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(c)(2) (1987); 45 C.F.R § 84.13(a) (1987).
106. Federal contractors are required to include in their contracts and subcontracts a provision
which forbids discrimination which includes unequal pay or benefits for handicapped employees.
41 C.F.R. § 60-741.4(a) (1987). Federal contractors and aid recipients are specifically forbidden
to use any practice which denies equal pay and benefits to handicapped employees. Id. § 60-
741.6(a); 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(b) (1987). State laws may, however, allow such exclusions or
practices. The Wisconsin Fair Employment Law once allowed such practices, but they are no
longer authorized under the statute as amended. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(5)(f) (West
1974), amended by Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.321 (West 1986) (discrimination now includes
contributing alesser amount to fringe benefits, including insurance coverage, for handicapped
employees).
107. N. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60.01 (4th ed. Supp. 1986).
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that prevent employment discrimination based on handicaps in general.10s
Other state provisions only address the problem in the context of recipients
of state funds. ,09 Some provisions are general and only apply by implication
to pre-employment inquiries.110 Several others specifically address the pre-
employment inquiry,"' including some which explicitly employ standards
based on BFOQs." 2
Ohio's pre-employment inquiry statute deserves special attention because
it contains an apparently unique provision. Ohio law prohibits inquiries
unless they are based on a BFOQ certified in advance by the Ohio Civil
Rights Commission." 3 A few states have statutes which specifically relate
to information about Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or
other infectious diseases."14
States whose statutes do not specifically address the pre-employment
inquiry may have regulations that implement the more general statute by
placing specific limits on pre-employment inquiries."' Even in states with-
out specific implementing regulations, the general prohibition embodied
in the statute can be applied to regulate pre-employment inquiries."16
108. A regularly updated collection of state statutes can be found in 8A Lab. L. Rep. (CCH)
451 :1-457:3515. See also Annotation, Construction and Effect of State Legislation Forbidding
Job Discrimination on Account of Physical Handicap, 90 A.L.R. 3d 393 (1979); Nichols, Iowa's
Law Prohibiting Disability Discrimination in Employment: An Overview, 32 DRAKE L. REV.
273 (1982-1983).
109. See supra note 108.
110. See Silverstein v. Sisters of Charity, 43 Colo. App. 466, 449, 614 P.2d 891, 894 (1980)
(legislature intended to penalize employers who discriminate against handicapped); Chicago,
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R. Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 87
Wash. 2d 802, 557 P.2d 307, 308 (1977) (unfair for any employer to discriminate on basis of
physical handicap). Contra Hurley v. Allied Chemical Corp., 262 N.E.2d 757, 765 (W. Va.
1980) (private cause of action may be inferred from state law, but no protection for person
without employment status).
11. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.140 (Baldwin 1982); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:2254(C)(8-
10) (West 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 5, § 4572(l)(A) (1980); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3,550
(206)(2) (Callaghan 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7(D) (1983); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.1(D)
(McKinney 1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.425(5) (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 43, § 955(b)(1)
(Purdon 1985); WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.180(1) (1985).
112. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(6) (1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402(d) (1982); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 601A.6(1)(c) (West 1983); MD. ANN. CODE ART. 100, § 95(A) (1985); MASS. ANN.
LAWS CH. 151B, § 9A (Law. Co-op. 1984); MINN. STAT. §§ 363.02(7)(i) - (iii) (1984); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 213.055(3) (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-5 (b)(5) (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS 28-7-4(D)
(1986); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180(4) (1985); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(d)(4) (1979).
113. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(E)(3) (Anderson 1986).
114. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.20 (West 1985) (AIDS); FLA. STAT. § 381.606
(1985); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. TIT. 5, § 170011-6 (1986) (AIDS); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.15
(West 1985) (AIDS).
115. See supra note 108 and authorities cited therein for particular state statutes.
116. In cases involving discharge grievances of employees with epilepsy it has been argued
that "when a 'just cause' provision of a contract is interpreted by an arbitrator, public policy
is often accorded considerable weight; after all, employers and unions are required to abide by
the law." Kovarsky & Hauck, supra note 18, at 599.
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In Montgomery Ward v. Bureau of Labor,"7 the Oregon Supreme Court
relied on the public policy expressed in the state statute to protect an
employee's overall well being. The court stated:
The reference [by the legislature] to the participation of [handicapped]
persons in the social and economic life of the state seems to include a
concern with their own health as well as with the merely economic
interest of the employer in effective performance. Accordingly, we
believe that the possibility that a particular job might be seriously
injurious to a handicapped person's health comes within the terms of
[the statute] as well as the person's outright inability to perform it. " ,
The seriousness of the potential for injury to an applicant is, however,
highly relevant. The appellate court in Montgomery Ward described the
criterion for determining the disability which justifies an employer's refusal
to employ as "a reasonable medical possibility that the applicant might
• ..experience injury as a result of attempting to perform the job." 19
The state supreme court stated that the appellate court's criteria set the
standard "too low," while the labor commission's "high probability"
went beyond the statute's policy goals.1 20
III. USE OF THE MATRIX TO EVALUATE THE EXISTING APPROACHES
With an overview of the usual approaches in hand, each approach can
be evaluated to determine which of the existing legal doctrines, laws, and
regulations are best suited to the problem of pre-employment inquiries. A
matrix can now be constructed to keep track of the various interests
involved, and used to assess the effect of each proposed solution. If this
evaluation reveals that none of the existing solutions are acceptable, the
matrix should, in any event, reveal which interests are most compromised
or best served by the existing solutions. A solution can then be generated
which pays particular attention to the identified problem areas.' 2'
In order to construct the matrix we must list the interests in a concise
fashion. Recalling to mind the interests described in some detail earlier,
they are:
APPLICANTS-gainful employment, protection of privacy, freedom
from vague questioning, personal safety, safety of others who could file
personal injury claims against him or her, and reasonable medical and
insurance costs;
117. 280 Or. 163, 570 P.2d 76 (1977).
118. Id. at 168, 570 P.2d at 78.
119. Id. at 165, 570 P.2d at 77 (emphasis in original).
120. Id. at 168, 570 P.2d at 78.
121. In the context of discrimination against AIDS carriers, some authorities regard the
problem as settled. It has been stated that "(i]f AIDS is a handicap, and if handicapped
employees are protected by law, then a single job applicant cannot be asked whether he or she
has AIDS. Nor can all applicants be asked routinely whether they have AIDS." "AIDS" in
the Workplace: A Special CCH Report, quoted in, AIDS in the Workplace, 22 TRAL 82, 82
(Jan. 1986).
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EMPLOYERS-qualified employees, low costs for hiring process, con-
tained costs for insurance and sick leave, low employee turnover rate,
and compliance with statutory requirements for safety and nondiscrim-
ination;
INSURANCE CARRIERS-large premium base accompanied by low
payouts, maintenance of employee safety and health, avoiding liability
claims by third parties, returning injured employees to work;
TAXPAYERS-full employment which lowers welfare, disability, med-
ical, and job placement related expenses supported by tax dollars;
OTHERS-payment of indigent hospital and medical expenses, and
safety for the general public and co-workers.
This list must be culled to reveal which interests are inextricably inter-
twined. Several of these interests can be expressed as a desire to have
reliable selection criteria. Several more can be grouped as an interest in
lower costs and increased safety. Evaluating the interests to determine
where they overlap yields a clearer picture of the relative weight each
interest should be accorded. For example, the interest in reliable selection
criteria should be accorded considerable weight because all parties share
that interest. The distilled list of interests yielded through this process
comprises one axis of the matrix.
Accepting that pre-employment inquiries should be limited to only ma-
terial information, the critical question is who should decide what infor-
mation is material. Little guidance is available to resolve this question
because most of the law addresses the interests at stake rather than which
procedure should be used.
Obviously, a complicated balancing of numerous interests is called for
to arrive at a method which determines the materiality of pre-employment
information.12  One federal district court simply stated that "the appli-
cant's right to privacy must be subordinated to the interests of the employer
in obtaining such information."''2 The court identified the employee's
privacy concern and the employer's need to know, but left unclear just
who determines the critical portion of the balancing test, namely, what
information is material.124
Certainly employers can invite applicants to volunteer information that
will qualify them for affirmative action. In fact federal contractors must
122. See McGarity & Schroder, Risk Oriented Employment Screening, 59 TEx. L. REV. 999
(1981) (exploring the problems of employment discrimination as employers develop and imple-
ment risk-oriented screening processes for hiring); Janis, A Unified Theory for Section 504
Employment Discrimination Analysis: Equivalent Cost-Based Standards for "Otherwise Qual-
ifled" & Reasonable Accommodation, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 63 (1986) (proposing a standard
cost-based analysis to determine whether or not an employer should be required to hire a
particular handicapped applicant).
123. Spencer v. Toussaint, 408 F. Supp. 1067, 1074 (E.D. Mich. 1976). See supra notes 76-
77 and accompanying text.
124. See generally Comment, Handicapped Workers: Who Should Bear the Burden of Proving
Job Qualifications, 38 ME. L. REV. 135 (1986) (developing an analytical model to address the
problems caused when fair employment opportunity laws protect handicapped individuals as
well as other persons).
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allow for voluntarily provided information. 25 Contractors must assure the
applicant that the information will remain confidential, that a refusal to
provide the information will not have adverse consequences, and that the
information will only be used in accordance with the anti-discrimination
laws and regulations. 126 None of these provisions, however, assist in de-
termining who determines whether particular information is material.
One alternative is to allow the applicant to determine what information
is material. If an applicant is only invited and never compelled to disclose
his or her handicap, the applicant would be the final authority on mate-
riality. Under this approach, there is a way to ask questions that produce
better results than generally phrased questions. If instead of asking for a
laundry list of "have you ever had's," specific information could be
sought, e.g., "A park ranger must walk about six miles cross country
daily. Will you be able to meet that requirement?" There may be applicants
who overestimate their abilities, but it will be readily apparent to applicants
that misrepresented abilities will not go undiscovered.
A second alternative is to allow the employer to determine materiality
since he knows the demands of the position. This system, however, is too
close to the current system which has proven to be unsatisfactory, as the
litigation and regulations described above demonstrate. The potential for
invasions of privacy and for unreliable results simply cannot be ignored.
A third approach, suggested by the Ohio statute discussed previously, 27
allows a governmental agency to determine materiality. 2s Employers could
submit BFOQs for each position and receive prior approval from a gov-
ernmental agency such as the state department of labor, human rights
commission, or other appropriate agency. At first blush, this system
appears expensive, but costs should be contained by use of the company's
own safety and operating procedure manuals and the U.S. Department of
Labor's Dictionary of Occupational Titles,129 which contains thousands of
detailed job descriptions.
A final illustrative, albeit unrealistic example, is to determine materiality
by lots. Suppose, for example, the need to disclose information about a
handicap was determined by a throw of dice-those with odd numbered
results would be required to disclose, while those with even numbers would
not.
The second axis of the matrix is comprised of these four possible methods
for determining the scope of pre-employment inquiries: the applicant
determines; the employer determines; a government agency determines; or
a throw of the dice determines. The matrix will plot the interests against
125. Appendix B to 41 C.F.R § 60-741 (1987) provides employers with a suggested form that
may be used to solicit the information.
126. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.5(c)(1) (1987).
127. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
128. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(E)(3) (Anderson 1986).
129. See supra note 35.
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the methods and assign one of three values at each intersection of interest
and method. Those values are: (1) the interest is served by the method;
(2) the interest is sacrificed by the method; or (3) the interest is placed at
risk by the method. We can now test each method to see where the
strengths and weaknesses of each method lie.
INTERESTS
APPLICANT OTHER EMPLOYER INSURERS
Lower Not over Not HireNot Re- Tae okqa noe Lwr Rate
m Privacy jected if Taxes & look qual- anyone Lower Competi-
E lifd Assured ified unquali- Risk tive
T Safety Apl'nts. fied tive
H DICE ? ? - - ?
0 APL'NT. + + ? ? ? ? +
D EMPLR. _+ ?
S GOV'T. + + + + ? +
Key + Interest is served
- Interest is sacrificed
? Interest is at risk
IV. ASSESSMENT OF MATRIX RESULTS
The matrix reveals that the use of dice is an unacceptable alternative.
Its use would have a mixed effect on invasion of privacy and qualified
persons would be rejected. While administrative costs are low, safety is
sacrificed. Insurers' interests would not be substantially affected because
their interests are tied to an applicant's hereditary makeup and dependents,
information not usually asked of job applicants.
Allowing the applicant to determine what must be disclosed probably
would result in a greater number of applicants being hired. This alternative
would reduce hiring costs and costs to taxpayers in the form of reduced
welfare and related benefits. This approach, however, would sacrifice
safety and ignores the employers' need to hire qualified applicants.
If the employers decide what must be disclosed, every interest would be
sacrificed except that of assuring only qualified applicants are hired. It
appears from the matrix that the greatest number of interests are served
when a government agency determines what questions may be asked of
applicants. 130
Although a government agency appears best suited to address the prob-
lems associated with pre-employment inquiries, a shortcoming of this
choice is not revealed by the matrix: bias on the part of the agency that
130. A similar system was upheld in McCrea v. Cunningham, 202 Neb. 638, 641, 277 N.W.2d
52, 58 (1979) (involving challenge to minimal visual acuity tests for certain municipal employees;
held not arbitrary or capricious requirement).
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approves BFOQs. If the agency is responsible for enforcing anti-discrim-
ination laws or reducing unemployment, employers may be concerned that
there is a bias in an applicant's favor. On the other hand, if the agency
has a close working relationship with industry, applicants may fear bias
which favors employers. Can this problem be solved?
A solution is readily available in the form of a tripartite commission.
If the commission has members from the state agency concerned with
industrial safety; from an agency that serves handicapped persons;' 3 ' and
from an agency that represents both interests such as an agency concerned
with vocational rehabilitation, any fears of bias would be quelled. The
size of the commission could be expanded to gain fair representation for
all viewpoints. Since the interests of the separate types of insurance carriers
act to cancel one another out, i.e., disability versus unemployment carriers,
the office of the state insurance commissioner could be a source of a
neutral representative. Overall, the commission could be composed such
that it fairly and expediently accommodates the interests of the public,
insurers, employers, and employees.
CONCLUSION
Employers, applicants, legislatures, and the courts could all benefit from
a close look at this matrix or similar ones constructed to suit their
particular needs, The analysis undertaken here has demonstrated that
employers must not rely on their own preconceived ideas about an indi-
vidual's capabilities. Employers must ground their employment decisions
on demonstrable evidence, even for those employees or applicants whom
they regard as having "an impairment.' 32
Careless pre-employment inquiries will cause difficulties of proof when
a challenge is later brought to particular employment decisions. If infor-
mation about pre-employment inquiries is sought, the employer should be
prepared to support the decision to ask certain questions. In their work
on employment discrimination, Schlei and Grossman suggest two basic
rules that will assure that application forms and other methods of pre-
employment inquiry are lawful: (1) do not ask for information that will
not be used, and (2) determine beforehand whether the question can be
lawfully asked of an applicant.'
131. For example, the protection and advocacy system created in each state under the
Developmentally Disabled and Assistance Bill of Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083
(1982 & Supp. III 1985), or even a private, nonprofit agency, i.e., American Coalition of
Citizens with Disabilities.
132. In Zorick v. Tynes, 372 So. 2d 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), a blind man challenged
the decision to refuse him employment as a physical education teacher. The court stated:
The decision to withdraw the employment offer was based, not on any identifiable
experience of school administrators ..., not on a test or interview of Zorick or
any trial of his abilities, but on ordinary preconceptions of sighted administrators
[which is contrary to the statute].
Id. at 142.
133. B.L. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 43, at 582.
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If employers altered their present hiring procedures they would also
protect themselves from discrimination claims.1 4 Often the person who
initially screens applicants is not the same person who makes the hiring
decision. Attitudinal barriers and bias could be avoided if the data initially
collected in regard to handicapping conditions is segregated from the other
application data so that subsequent interviewers would not have access to
the information. Those making the hiring decision should have an oppor-
tunity to form a first impression without prior knowledge of any handi-
capping condition. This is particularly important for applicants with readily
visible handicaps. This suggestion would be easily implemented through a
review of applications in advance of any personal interviews with the
applicant.
Applicants could also contribute to the hiring process and avoid prob-
lems if they viewed questions in applications as asking whether their
condition would "have a material effect on job ability." Another alter-
native, but riskier, is to refuse to answer certain questions. A third
suggestion is for the applicant to request an explanation of the question's
relevance to the position. " 'Why would that be relevant to this job?' is
an assertive but not abrasive reply."'3
Legislators also play a vital role is assuring that only material questions
are asked of applicants. Legislation which conforms to the Ohio statute, 36
tailored to each state's particular agencies and needs, should be enacted
and enforced. Finally, the courts have to contribute by ruling that pre-
employment inquiries about handicaps are proper only when material to
the position sought. The federal statute that prohibits giving false infor-
mation on job applications,'3 7 and any similar statutes, should be inter-
preted to apply only to statements that are both false and material.
The problem of attaining as full employment as safety permits while
providing job opportunities to the handicapped is complicated but not
insoluble. When all parties understand how their interests are being served
by the system, cooperation should be forthcoming and the parties ready
to create and implement fair procedures.
134. The testing procedures would have to be evaluated and changed where necessary. In
Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666 (1 lth Cir. 1983), the written test given to a man with dyslexia
did not satisfy the obligation to expand employment opportunities for the handicapped under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
135. Interview Questions: Which Are Legal, Which Are Not, 82 GLAMOUR 218 (Nov. 1984),
condensed from, SACK, DON'T GET TAKEN (1985).
136. See supra note 113.
137. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982). See Bryson v. United States, 296 U.S. 64 (1969) (upholding
conviction for "false and fraudulent" denial of Communist Party affiliation on NLRB affidavit).
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